July 26, 2018—Even in July, with the heat of summer still blazing, you can’t get away from ice hockey in Minnesota. However, now that the Vegas Golden Knights have settled their dispute with the U.S. Army, it was starting to look like we were running out of hockey trademark news. Thankfully, the National Hockey League came through at the last second, filing a trademark infringement lawsuit on July 23. At issue is the NHL’s rights in the design of its championship trophy, the Stanley Cup, and the defendants’ sale of allegedly infringing beer mugs shaped like the Stanley Cup.

The defendants comprise companies, purportedly all owned or managed by the same individual, operating primarily under the name “The Hockey Cup LLC.” According to the complaint, the Hockey Cup has been selling unauthorized reproductions of the Stanley Cup as well as counterfeit jerseys. The company even applied to register trademarks for THE CUP HOCKEY. The NHL opposed the applications and, in response, the Hockey Cup counterclaimed to cancel the twelve registrations asserted by the NHL on the grounds of lack of ownership, abandonment, non-use, and fraud. With the gloves now off, the NHL chose to escalate the skirmish and sue the Hockey Cup in the Southern District of New York for trademark infringement, false association, dilution, copyright infringement, and unfair competition.

There is a good chance that the Hockey Cup will also assert its counterclaim for cancellation of the NHL’s registrations in the lawsuit. The counterclaim essentially argues that the NHL does not control the actual, physical Stanley Cup, and therefore the NHL cannot have trademark rights in the design of, or name of, the Stanley Cup. Strangely enough, this part of the argument has some truth to it. Since 1893, the Stanley Cup has been controlled by a pair of trustees. In 1926, the Trustees reached an agreement with the NHL, and the NHL has been the sole organization associated with the cup ever since, with continued permission from the Trustees. If that’s true, the Hockey Cup’s claims appear to be a bit of an underdog in this legal matchup.

But does the Hockey Cup’s sale of beer mugs in the shape of the Stanley Cup create a likelihood of confusion with the NHL? The NHL claims in its complaint that it has sold beer mugs in the shape of the trophy in the past, but none appear to be available at the moment. The NHL is selling Stanley Cup shaped ornaments, paperweights, inflatable trophies, miniature crystal replicas, and, for some reason, a popcorn maker. If we’re sticking with the booze, the NHL is selling a shot glass with a picture of the Stanley Cup. But yet, no beer mugs in the shape of the trophy.

To prevail though, the NHL does not need to show that it has lost sales due to the defendant’s conduct. Instead, there must only be a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, connection, or affiliation. One plausible argument in support of the NHL’s claim is that consumers will mistakenly assume that the mug has been licensed by the NHL.

In fact, one recent case from the Eleventh Circuit is quite relevant to the dispute. In that case, the Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. sued an unauthorized online manufacturer and seller of apparel that was selling clothing with the school’s name. Savannah Coll. of Art and Design, Inc. v. Sportswear, Inc., 872 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2017). The school sued, but the school could not establish that it began selling apparel with the school’s name before the defendant. Based on this, the district court concluded that the school’s rights in the mark with respect to education services did not provide it with trademark rights in the name for clothing. The district court granted summary judgement to the defendant.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, relying on precedent involving – you guessed it – hockey:

One of our older trademark cases, Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), controls, as it extends protection for federally-registered service marks to goods. Although Boston Hockey does not explain how or why this is so, it constitutes binding precedent that we are bound to follow.

As the quote suggests, the Eleventh Circuit is not certain that the precedent was rightly decided. In that decision, the NHL and the Boston team sued a manufacturer to prevent the sale of patches featuring team names and logos. The NHL had registered the marks for hockey game entertainment services, but not for any goods. The court noted the decision has been criticized but never overturned. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Boston Hockey ruling. The NHL—and any other school, sport team, or other organization with an appreciable amount of merchandising—will want to pay attention to the resolution of the case, and consider filing applications to register their marks for valuable, merchandised products.

In the meantime, we’ll watch the ownership dispute play out between the NHL and the Hockey Cup. While it appears to be a longshot, perhaps ownership of the cup will return to the people of Canada, as some prefer (mostly Canadians). Until then, we’ll leave you with the words of Lord Stanley himself, announcing the creation of the Stanley Cup in 1892:

July 13, 2018—Hawaii seems to be on the mind here at DuetsBlog lately. Last week, I had the pleasure of visiting three Hawaiian islands for the first time. While there, I quickly became acquainted with Hawaiian life and language. It’s a beautiful place; I recommend everyone visit.

When I first landed on Kauai, the “garden island,” I was quickly greeted with “Aloha,” in sound, sight, and mind. Although most understand “Aloha” to be a friendly greeting, the word has much greater meaning. It also means love, affection, peace, compassion, and mercy. In one word, it embodies Hawaii–and, indeed, the State of Hawaii has declared that Aloha is its official spirit. It is “more than a word of greeting or farewell or a salutation. . . . ‘Aloha’ means mutual regard and affection and extends warmth in caring with no obligation in return. ‘Aloha’ is the essence of relationships in which each person is important to every other person for collective existence. ‘Aloha’ means to hear what is not said, to see what cannot be seen and to know the unknowable.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 5-7.5(a). All government employees are instructed to “contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the ‘Aloha Spirit.’” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 5-7.5(b). I guess they don’t call it the “Aloha State” for nothing!

With such importance to native Hawaiians, citizens of Hawaii, and the State itself, it is no wonder that “Aloha” has also become a popular company, place, product, and service name on the islands. Throughout my journey there, I began to notice Aloha almost everywhere I went. See, for example, the following:

And the list goes on… In fact, a basic USPTO search revealed almost 500 live Aloha marks, and a search on the Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs revealed over 10,000!

Seeing Aloha used so frequently caused me to ponder the potential risks of choosing a word like ‘Aloha’ for use in a brand. On the one hand, the word used in connection with most goods, services, and places is arbitrary or fanciful. What is, for example, “Aloha Tofu?” And the word may be suggestive or descriptive of Hawaiian roots. But on the other hand, the word “Aloha” is so ubiquitous that it can hardly be said to be inherently distinctive. Its common use, standing alone, does not immediately identify a single source and seemingly undermines the ability to develop secondary meaning in the minds of at least a Hawaiian public constantly bombarded with the word. Tying additional words to Aloha (e.g., “Aloha Fridays” or “Liquid Aloha”) might create more distinctiveness. But there seems to be an overarching risk that the mark’s initial generic non-distinctiveness will never be overcome. This risk is akin to genericide, but not due to expropriation–rather, widespread appropriation.

I enjoy the Aloha spirit and hope it spreads far and wide. But its ubiquitous adoption could turn a word which means quite a bit (see above), into a word which means very little when it comes to trademark law.

July 11, 2018—On a recent shopping trip, I couldn’t help but notice some interesting brand extensions inside and outside the stores.

My encounter inside involved Burt’s Bees. The brand encompasses a wide variety of lip balms, lotions, cosmetics, and personal body care items. (pets, too). Yet I discovered a new addition to the lineup: Burt’s Bees protein shake powder.

While most cosmetics and lip balm companies don’t make a jump into the nutrition field (a ChapStick shake just doesn’t sound appetizing), Burt’s Bees’ extension seems to make sense. In my mind, I’ve always associated it with an image of healthy, natural products, and nutrition products seem to fit that image.

Outside, I ran into a similar situation in the lawn and garden center: a blast from childhood past:

This seemed a bit further afield than Burt’s Bees. Had my childhood sugary “fruit” drink really expanded into live flowers? After all, the company does sell Hawaiian Punch lip balm.

However, the answer seems to be no. The flowers are a sold by Canadian company Fernlea Flowers. The company has even registered the mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, without an opposition from Dr. Pepper/Seven Up (the owner of rights in the HAWAIIAN PUNCH mark).

Are flowers sufficiently related to fruit juice and lip balm such that Dr. Pepper should have objected to the use of HAWAIIAN PUNCH for flowers? Generally speaking, I’d say the goods are highly unrelated. Yet the marks are identical, the HAWAIIAN PUNCH mark has been licensed for other non-food goods, and the HAWAIIAN PUNCH mark is arguably famous. Plus, the mark could have been licensed because the flowers are the colors of various flavors of Hawaiian Punch drinks. Are these factors enough to create a likelihood of confusion?

If there isn’t a likelihood of confusion, is there a claim for dilution? This seems more plausible, but would extending protection of HAWAIIAN PUNCH to live plants in this instance effectively give the owner a right in gross to the phrase HAWAIIAN PUNCH? Is that okay for marks that can establish that they are famous? What do you think, was this an enforcement punch worth pulling?

June 27, 2018—They say you can’t run away from your past, it will eventually catch up to you. Sazerac Brands may have just learned that lesson the hard way, thanks to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Sazerac Brands owns rights in the OLD TAYLOR and COLONEL E.H. TAYLOR brands of whiskey (distilled at Sazerac’s Buffalo Trace distillery). It isn’t surprising, then, that Sazerac was not pleased when a new company, Peristyle, began using “Old Taylor” to refer to its in-development distillery in social media and in the press. Sazerac sued Peristyle for trademark infringement, resulting in a multi-year legal battle that ended earlier this month with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling (probably, pending further review).

But back to the history lesson. In 1887, Colonel Edmond Haynes Taylor, Jr.  built the Old Taylor Distillery in Kentucky, one of the most prolific distilleries of its time. It was more like the destination breweries you see today: it was a castle with gardens, pools, turrets, pergolas, and other embellishments that were uncommon at the time.

Prohibition came and sales disappeared. The distillery and the brand changed hands multiple times after World War II. Ultimately, the distillery was shut down in 1972, but Old Taylor brand whiskey continued. Most recently, the rights to the brand were purchased by Sazerac in 2009. The actual distillery became abandoned and run-down. Nature and vandals took their toll, even on the once picturesque pool (seen below, or here for more photos).

It remained this way until 2014, when Peristyle purchased the land with the intent of renovating the grounds and buildings for a new brand of whiskey. However, at the time of renovation, Peristyle had not yet decided on a new name and instead referred to the location as “the Former Old Taylor Distillery” or simply “Old Taylor.” Even though the distillery had been shut down for more than forty years, there was still a 400 foot “Old Taylor Distillery” sign on a warehouse and a “The Old Taylor Distillery Company” sign located at building’s main entrance.

Peristyle informed Sazerac that it intended to market its spirits under a different name than Old Taylor. Yet Sazerac pressed forward with its claims, even after Peristyle announced that its products would be marketed under the brand Castle & Key. Part of Sazerac’s concerns stemmed from Peristyle’s intent to keep the Old Taylor signs on its distillery and the “Old Taylor” name as well as continued references to Old Taylor in marketing and in the press for Castle & Key.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Peristyle, concluding that Peristyle’s display and usage constituted fair use of the Old Taylor trademark. The court reasoned that Peristyle’s use of the name was historical in nature, describing the origins of the distillery and its physical location. After all, the court noted, the building is listed as the “Old Taylor Distillery” on the National Register of Historic Places.

It’s difficult to fault Sazerac for being concerned by Peristyle’s conduct, at least initially. But the court’s decision provides a lesson beyond history: owners of brands with a long lifespan should carefully consider the context in which a third-party is “using” their mark and whether fair use may apply.

June 22, 2018—Recently, we have been covering updates from a trademark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition action between Buc-ee’s and Choke Canyon, two rival Texas convenience stores with endless rows of gas pumps and checkout lanes (everything’s bigger in Texas, you know; even gas stations). About a month ago, a Texas jury found that the Choke Canyon alligator logo infringes on Buc-ee’s beaver logo:

But as I pointed out when covering the jury’s verdict, it wasn’t clear exactly why these two logos are confusingly similar and to what extent. Could it be the fact that both of the logos contain cartoon animals, who wear hats, who face right, who are smiling, who have red tongues, against a yellow-ish background? Some combination of these features? Additional features? The jury’s verdict doesn’t say; the jury only decided that the Choke Canyon logo infringed, but they weren’t asked to explain why.

However, the jury did send one note to the judge while deliberating, giving some clue as to infringement. In that note, the jury asked, “Does the logo to be considered by the jury in rendering an infringement judgment include a version without words?” To which the Judge responded, “Yes.” Not much insight, but at least we know the jury did not focus on Choke Canyon’s circular ribbon.

The reasons for the finding of infringement often have considerable implications. After such a finding, typically the prevailing trademark owner desires injunctive relief (in addition to damages) against the infringer–in the form of a court order prohibiting the infringer from using the too-similar mark. That form of equitable relief cannot be determined by a jury and has to come from the judge. Still, it seems like it might be useful for the judge, in crafting the injunction, to know why the jury felt the marks were so similar as to create customer confusion. This intuition has recently come to bear as the litigation between Buc-ee’s and Choke Canyon has progressed past trial.

Earlier this week, Buc-ee’s moved for a permanent injunction against Choke Canyon (you can read the motion here). Buc-ee’s seeks a permanent injunction barring Choke Canyon’s use of a whole host of similar logos, which were part of a package of example uses submitted to the jury and sampled below:

Buc-ee’s says that Choke Canyon’s proposed injunction is not expansive enough because it does not include or cover any of the black and white logos, only the colorful ones. Buc-ee’s says it “fought tooth and nail”–great imagery, given that it is represented by a beaver mascot–to obtain the finding of infringement of all marks, regardless of whether they include color. But the color similarities (the red tongues and yellow backgrounds) seem pretty important in the context of an infringement battle that otherwise comes down to smiling beaver versus a thumbs-up alligator.

Even though the jury may have technically considered all of the examples provided by Buc-ee’s, an injunction is an equitable remedy, and the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1116) provides that courts shall issue injunctions “according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable.” As part of this inquiry, courts consider (1) whether the trademark owner has suffered irreparable injury, (2) whether damages are adequate to compensate for the injury, (3) whether, considering the balance of hardships between the trademark owner and infringer, the requested relief is warranted, and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved by a permanent injunction. Courts frequently grant only limited or qualified injunctions and tailor them to the facts of the case, sometimes by restricting certain formats and locations and requiring disclaimers or corrective advertising.

This is all to say that the scope of an injunction in this case and others depends on the circumstances and the court’s view of what is equitable and reasonable–a flexible standard. In trademark, courts focus on what relief is necessary to remedy and prevent consumer confusion, as well as the potential effects an injunction would have on lawful competition–an important factor that should not be overlooked in this case (perhaps not only as to the parties, but also as to the precedent the court might set generally). What do you think that might be?

June 8, 2018—One of the most common defenses to patent infringement is that the asserted patent is invalid. The reasons for invalidity regularly range from lack of utility, to incorrect inventorship, and even to fraud (as I’ve recently written about). Often, the defendant asserts that the patent is invalid for lack of novelty or non-obviousness–pointing to some piece of evidence that the defendant says conclusively shows that the invention was already in the public domain before the plaintiff even applied for the patent. That evidence is called invalidating “prior art.”

Prior art can spell the unexpected demise of an otherwise valid patent, and it comes in many forms. For several decades, published prior art (not to be confused with prior art in the form of prior uses or sales) consisted of already-existing patents (and applications), trade journals, drawings, articles, websites, standards, whitepapers, etc. But Congress expanded the scope of published prior art dramatically in passing the America Invents Act in 2012. Whereas before prior art consisted merely of “printed publications,” post-AIA, prior art also encompasses things that are “otherwise available to the public.”

The larger–and more modern–universe of possible published prior art is easy to imagine. For example, prior art references are no longer limited to traditional publications and documentary evidence. Instead, additional forms of multimedia come into play–which is fitting in today’s multimedia-packed times. Videos, movies, broadcasts, and recordings all now qualify as prior art, so long as they are available to the public.

But despite this expansion, litigants have not yet fully taken advantage of the change. There have been a few recent uses of video as prior art, such as the iconic iPhone keynote speech made by the late Steve Jobs demonstrating a technology described in an Apple patent. Ironically, in commenting on the “bounce-back” effect that was the subject of the patent, Steve Jobs stated, “boy have we patented it.” But Apple failed to patent it fast enough after the speech.

Samsung used clips from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey to argue that Apple’s design patent for the shape of a tablet was invalidating prior art.

Apple really seems to be taking the brunt of video prior art challenges.

Just one week ago, a Federal district judge in the Northern District of Florida addressed–apparently for the first time–whether a YouTube video could constitute prior art. The court, in HVLPO2, LLC v. Oxygen Frog, LLC, 4:16-CV-336 (MW/CAS) (Dkt. No. 133), held that a YouTube video can constitute prior art and that YouTube videos are “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Not exactly a groundbreaking finding to someone of my generation, who grew up with YouTube and the internet. Indeed, the USPTO’s own training guides (slide 15) specifically state that YouTube videos are a perfectly acceptable form of prior art. The USPTO has stated that videos qualified prior to the AIA, but there is conflicting authority.

The plaintiff in HVLPO2 had argued that the particular YouTube video in question was uploaded on a random account, so no one interested in the art would have found it. The court pushed back in eccentric fashion, stating:

It appears that Plaintiff is unfamiliar with how YouTube works. A familiar user would know that you don’t need to search for a particular channel to watch the videos uploaded on it. For example, if you want to watch a video of a cat skateboarding, you can search “cat skateboarding”; you don’t need to know that it might have been “CatLady83” who uploaded the video you end up watching.

The court held that the YouTube video in question appeared within the first 20 videos when using appropriate search terms on the site. “Surely, the effort involved in composing a basic search query and scrolling down the page a few times does not exceed the ‘reasonable diligence’ that the law expects of a hypothetical prior art subject.” I couldn’t agree more, and I recommend this fun cat skateboarding video:

But even though most YouTube videos are generally accessible, not all are available to the public. For example, YouTube videos may be “private” or “unlisted,” potentially removing them from the “otherwise available to the public” category or at least undermining the argument for their accessibility. Thus, as even the court in HVLPO2 noted, the defendant still has to prove the existence of public access to the video prior to the applicable date. This can be accomplished by proffering screenshots of the video in the browser and evidence of that video’s publication date (which is disclosed on the YouTube website and many other video sharing platforms).

Besides the above, there are few other examples of videos (online or otherwise) being used as prior art. This is probably due in part to the current difficulty of searching the vast amount of video and audio–as opposed to text, for example–available on the internet. But as computer learning gets better and better, I expect audiovisual prior art will play a bigger role in both patent prosecution and litigation, so long as that prior art is “otherwise available to the public.”

May 25, 2018—About a week ago, we reported on an interesting case out of the Southern District of Texas involving two competing convenience stores with cartoon animal mascots: Buc-ee’s (a beaver) and Choke Canyon (an alligator).

As someone who has personally visited Buc-ee’s stores, I can tell you that they are quite the destination. Buc-ee’s stores tend to be absolutely massive, with checkout lanes(everything’s bigger in Texas). People even buy T-shirts with Buc-ee’s logos on the front, with various Texan sayings on the back. I personally own three of them. So it’s kind of an understatement to call Buc-ee’s a “convenience store,” by Minnesota standards. And one can hardly complete a description of Buc-ee’s without noting that it is considered to have the “best bathrooms in Texas.”

Credit: Houston Chronicle

Choke Canyon? Yeah, its locations are pretty big too, but the mascot is far less cuddly. Though, it has a nice saying above the exit that probably wouldn’t work at Buc-ee’s: “See ya later, alligator.”

Credit: Yelp

Buc-ee’s sued Choke Canyon for a variety of claims, including: trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. We cover these topics frequently on DuetsBlog (check out the topics column).

I must admit that when I first read about the suit, I could hardly believe it. I agree with my colleague that “the best I see from this case is that Choke Canyon may make consumers think of Buc-ee’s stores and beaver, but consumers don’t seem likely to assume that that there is a connection between the two.” And I also think that ” if it weren’t May, I’d assume this was an April Fools Day joke.”

But it’s no joke, and after a four-day jury trial and six hours of deliberation, Buc-ee’s won on all fronts. Specifically, the jury answered six questions (downloadable here):

1. On Buc-ee’s claims for trademark infringement of its Buc-ee’s Logo, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
   • Jury answer: Buc-ee’s
   • Interestingly, the jury sent one note to the District Judge during deliberations, asking “Does the logo to be considered by the jury in rendering an infringement judgment include a version without words?” To which the Judge responded, “Yes.”
2. Do you find that Buc-ee’s Logo was famous throughout Texas before Choke Canyon’s use of the Choke Canyon Logo?
   • Jury answer: Yes
3. Because the jury answered “yes” to question 2, they skipped question 3 (which pertained to specific geographic areas in Texas).
4. On Buc-ee’s claim for dilution by blurring of its Buc-ee’s Logo, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
   • Jury answer: Buc-ee’s
5. On Buc-ee’s claim for unfair competition, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
   • Jury answer: Buc-ee’s
6. On Buc-ee’s claim for unjust enrichment, do you find for Buc-ee’s or Choke Canyon?
   • Jury Answer: Buc-ee’s

I am surprised by the generality of the questions presented to the jury, and it’s interesting that the jury was not asked about damages–perhaps the issue was bifurcated and will be tried to a different jury.

Question 1, and the jury note, suggests to me that the jury was allowed to focus purely on the similarities between the cartoon animals in the above logos, disregarding Choke Canyon logo’s ribbon stating “Choke Canyon Travel Centers.” But even then, the only obvious similarities are the orientation of the mascots, the yellow background, the wearing of a hat, and their smiles and red tongues. It is hard to believe those basic, nominal characteristics are enough to show consumer confusion and infringement. Maybe Choke Canyon has a good chance on appeal or at judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

And I cannot help but wonder, in view of Question 2, whether the fact that Buc-ee’s mark was famous throughout Texas prior to Choke Canyon’s use of its alligator mark played the most important role in the jury’s verdict. Perhaps the jury felt that Choke Canyon intended to ride on Buc-ee’s mark. Indeed, at closing argument, Buc-ee’s counsel reminded the jurors that a survey showed more than 80% of Texans recognize the Buc-ee’s logo. But I tend to agree with Choke Canyon’s closing argument that the lawsuit seems directed at stifling competition, rather than truly protecting consumers–pointing to Buc-ee’s own prior statement that it only noticed the potential for consumer confusion when Choke Canyon began buying property in towns where Buc-ee’s operates. I find it hard to believe that a reasonable consumer would seriously confuse the two mascots and think they were associated. But apparently two actual-consumer witnesses testified in Buc-ee’s favor on this point. Texas sure is a strange place sometimes.

May 16, 2018—Who do you think would win in a fight to the death: a beaver or an alligator? Sure, alligators seem scarier. They’re known for sharp teeth and strong jaws. They even have a 1980 horror movie about them called Alligator (Side note: the plot summary makes this sound like a must-see). Beavers? Not so much. Small and furry. They cut down trees. Sure, there was a television series called Angry Beavers, but it was a kids cartoon on Nickelodeon. Those beavers didn’t live in the Chicago sewers feasting on discarded animal carcasses from secret government laboratories testing mutating growth hormones (Again, this Alligator movie sounds like a must-see).

But what if this isn’t just a regular beaver? What if this is a beaver with an entire travel center full of deli stations, gasoline pumps, bathrooms, and over three decades of use? Oh! And did I mention the red baseball cap? It may not sound that scary to you, or alligators in general, but for the Choke Canyon Alligator, the fear might be starting to build. While an alligator likely gets the best of a beaver in the animal kingdom, the courtroom is an entirely different venue.

The animals underlying this dispute are beavers and alligators, but the parties are Buc-ee’s, Ltd., Shepherd Retail, Inc., and Harlow Food, Inc. The plaintiff is Buc-ee’s, the operating of a chain of Buc-ee’s travel stations throughout Texas. The defendants Shepherd Retail and Harlow Food operate a travel center under the name Choke Canyon, also in Texas. The dispute centers around Buc-ee’s claim that Choke Canyon’s design logo is similar to Buc-ee’s logo. A jury was impaneled earlier this week to help decide whether these logos are confusingly similar, but in the meantime, you can put on your juror hat and compare the parties’ logos yourself.

Thoughts? And to finish any potential arguments before they get started, this is an alligator, not a crocodile. Crocodiles can’t stick out their tongues (We’re not just a trademark blog, we’re a science blog, too.)

Here’s how Buc-ee’s summarized the similarity of the marks in the Complaint:

Defendants’ anthropomorphic and cartoon representation of the alligator as shown above in connection with a convenience store copies the most important aspects of the iconic BUC- EE’S Marks. Specifically, besides Defendants’ improper use of a friendly smiling cartoon animal, Defendants have copied the BUC-EE’S Marks with: (i) the use of a black circle encompassing the alligator (compare to the black circle around the beaver), (2) use of a yellow background (compare to the yellow surrounding the beaver), (3) use of the red-colored tongue of the alligator (compare to the red hat on the beaver), (4) prominent use of sharply drawn black edges for the alligator mascots (compare to the sharp crisp black edges defining the beaver, and (5) the use of letters in raised block font in the name “CHOKE CANYON”

This also isn’t the first trademark battle for Buc-ee’s. The beaver has already defeated two chickens (settled out of court):

And a rival (but hatless) beaver (settled out of court):

As a general matter, I think trademark plaintiffs are too easily branded with the label of a “trademark bully,” but this one seems like a stretch.

Granted, I’ve never been in any of either party’s stores. Perhaps the manner in which the marks are advertised adds to the confusion. In fact, Buc-ee’s also claimed that Choke Canyon’s trade dress infringed upon Buc-ee’s trade dress. The layout of a store or restaurant can be protectable trade dress under the Lanham Act. Even if the individual elements may not be protectable (for example, cactus in a Mexican restaurant), the overall selection and arrangement of even unprotectable elements may give rise to protectable trade dress.

Buc-ee’s claimed trade dress for its travel store-restaurant-convenience store-gas station consists of:

(a) consistent use of bell-gabled roof lines;
(b) Use of a red, white, yellow and black color scheme in store signage;
(c) Use of stone siding on the exterior of the store;
(d) Consistent use of a specific and distinctive fountain drink set up in the interior of the stores;
(e) In-store computer ordering kiosks;
(f) Horse-shoe shaped in-store carving stations;
(g) Open counter deli stations;
(h) Freshly prepared signature food choices;
(i) Consistent, prominent use of the BUC-EE’S Marks in signage above and on the products offered for sale;
(j) Large square footage;
(k) Numerous fuel pumps;
(l) Abundant and oversized parking spaces;
(m) Oversized bathrooms;
(n) A multitude of cashier stations;
(o) Entrances from three of the four sides of the building.
(p) Antique-looking displays;
(q) Country-themed signage; and
(r) Khaki paint colors.

I’m no expert in convenience stores, but most of the elements seem like generic elements of a travel center, restaurant, or convenience store. The antique and country themed signage is not as much of a required element for these types of store, but it hardly seems unique for a convenience store or gas station to have a country theme. Like the claim of trademark infringement based on the use of a cartoon character with a hat, I also have doubts as to the success of the trade dress infringement.

But is the combination of the two enough to nudge these claims over the edge into potential infringement? Based on publicly available information, the best I see from this case is that Choke Canyon may make consumers think of Buc-ee’s stores and beaver, but consumers don’t seem likely to assume that that there is a connection between the two. While it can be a fine line, trademark law is pretty consistent that merely “calling to mind” is insufficient to establish trademark infringement. There must instead be a possibility of consumer confusion as to source, sponsorship, or some other connection.

It is possible additional facts will come out during trial to bolster Buc-ee’s claims. Perhaps there really was a pattern of intentional copying, from the yellow background of the circle logo, to the store layout, down to individual products being offered, like the purportedly famous “Beaver Nuggets” (aka, caramel corn). Stay posted for future updates as the trial proceeds and ends. We’ll also keep a lookout for comments from our neighbor to the east, the other cartoon Bucky:

May 11, 2018—In recent USPTO news, Trader Joe’s, the supermarket chain known for its eclectic and unique foodstuffs, recently filed an opposition to registration of the mark “Trader Schmo,” which is described as designating a wide variety of Kosher foods. Understandably, Trader Joe’s took issue with the mark, and particularly its use in the food category. The company instituted an opposition (which I cannot help but note is #999,999), arguing that “Trader Schmo” will confuse consumers because consumers will naturally switch “Joe’s” with “Schmo,” given the popular phrase “Joe Schmo.”

This is not the first time Trader Joe’s has taken legal action to protect its brand. Notably, just a couple years ago the company sued “Pirate Joe’s,” a counterfeiter with a backstory almost too unbelievable to be true. Pirate Joe’s was a “rebel Canadian grocery operation,” which bought Trader Joe’s products in the United States and “smuggle[d] them across the border to Vancouver” to sell them. Pirate Joe’s eventually ran aground under the immense pressure of its legal fees.

Pirate Joe’s Comes Crashing Down, Credit: Georgia Straight

This new dispute reminds me of the famous “Dumb Starbucks” experiment by comedy TV series Nathan For You. Over one weekend in 2014, the show opened a coffee shop that looked just like a real Starbucks, except that its name and every drink it sold was preceded by the word “dumb.” The comedian behind the prank (or “art“) claimed that “Dumb Starbucks” was permissible fair use because both the use of the Starbucks mark, as well as the store itself, was one big parody. One cannot help but notice some parallels to Trader Schmo; the latter word refers to a hypothetical “dumb” person.

Comedian Nathan Fielder, Credit: New Yorker

Dumb Starbucks and Trader Schmo raise difficult questions about permissible comedic use under trademark law. On the one hand, the marks free ride on the notoriety of other marks, bringing attention. On the other, it seems unlikely the marks would cause actual consumer confusion, making them harmless jokes. Whether Trader Schmo runs afoul of the Lanham Act will likely depend on two major inquiries: (1) whether it constitutes infringement or dilution, and (2) whether statutory fair use defenses apply.

Infringement: Previously on this blog, I explained that infringement usually centers on likelihood of confusion, which is evaluated using a variety of factors:

whether the use is related, the strength of the mark, proximity of the use, similarities of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels employed, the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers, the user’s intent in selecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion of product/service lines.

The factors could support a finding of infringement here. The uses are related (food). The strength of the Trader Joe’s mark rides the line between arbitrary and fanciful to descriptive; who is Trader Joe in the abstract, and what does he sell? Surely the marks are similar…sounding. But on the other hand, would an average Joe really mistake Trader Schmo for Trader Joe’s? As a counter, though, it seems reasonable to infer that Trader Schmo was selected because it is similar to Trader Joe’s.

Dilution: So there might be infringement. How about dilution? This occurs when the similarity between the accused mark and a famous mark is likely to impair the distinctiveness or reputation of the famous mark. Dilution does not require any actual or likely consumer confusion. Depending on how good Trader Schmo’s Baba Ganoush, Gefilte fish, Matzo ball soup, and Borscht taste, Trader Joe’s could have an argument for dilution–especially if Trader Schmo’s grows large enough to undermine the distinctiveness of Trader Joe’s as a famous brand.

Fair Use: Generally speaking, the fair use provisions for infringement and dilution both require: (1) that the accused mark be used in a descriptive sense and not as a mark, and (2) that use of the accused mark be fair and in good faith. However, fair use does not provide a defense to infringement if there is likelihood of confusion–but we’ll gloss over that for now.

First, Trader Schmo could arguably be descriptive, delineating traded products. And the word ‘schmo’ has Jewish roots, which could describe the Kosher foods the mark designates. On the other hand, Trader Schmo isn’t inherently descriptive in that it actually describes a product or a characteristic or quality (e.g., Vision Center, a store for glasses). And it’s being used as a mark. So fair use might not even apply.

Assuming descriptiveness, the second element (the ‘fair’ aspect of the doctrine of fair use) often implicates the kinds of First Amendment interests that protect parody, satire, and criticism. But there’s no indication that Trader Schmo is intended to comment on Trader Joe’s. Moreover, courts have rejected the idea that a use is “fair” or in good faith if its similarity to a protected mark is deliberately concocted to garner attention. Trader Joe’s could have a good case for that here–just as Starbucks likely had against Dumb Starbucks.

A high-level analysis of the Trader Schmo mark suggests it could constitute infringement or dilution and is not fair use. This conclusion underscores trademark law’s general distaste for humor when it comes to commerce, as opposed to actual social commentary and comparison.

May 4, 2018—Legal departments sometimes get a bad reputation for saying “no” too often. A “no” from legal is particularly hard to stomach when you think the potential legal risk is farfetched. In this dispute, Wal-Mart must have decided that there was no way a competitor could own the basic word BACKYARD for grills and grilling accessories. However, after some discovery and a motion for summary judgment, Wal-Mart was left holding a tab for $34 million in damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. Thankfully for Wal-Mart, the Fourth Circuit just issued a decision vacating the award and the grant of summary judgment.

The plaintiff is Variety Stores, Inc., a regional retail chain in the southeast that sells lawn, garden, and grilling products. The company owns a registration for THE BACKYARD for retail store services and has also used variations of the mark such as BACKYARD and BACKYARD BBQ for grilling products. One of their advertisements is included below.

About 20 years after Variety’s first use, Wal-Mart decided to develop an in-house line of grilling products. During the clearance search for potential names like BACKYARD BARBECUE and BACKYARD BBQ, Wal-Mart’s in-house legal group identified Variety’s prior registration and advised the business team that Variety’s registration could pose a problem. Wal-Mart decided to go with BACKYARD GRILL, filed an application to register the mark with the US Patent and Trademark Office, and began selling products, like the ones below.

At the district court, Variety prevailed on for summary judgment. In evaluating the likelihood of confusion factors, the district court concluded :

• Wal-Mart intended to create confusion because Wal-Mart moved forward with the name despite the legal department’s concerns;
• Variety’s mark was strong because of large numbers of sales and advertising expense, the court declined to give any weight to Wal-Mart’s evidence of dozens of third-parties using variations of BACKYARD with grilling products;
• The grilling products were competitive;
• The two marks – BACKYARD GRILL and BACKYARD (or BACKYARD BBQ) – were nearly identical; and
• That Wal-Mart’s consumer surveys regarding the absence of confusion were faulty and should be given little weight.

The court concluded that the infringement was willful and awarded $32.5 million in profits and $1.5 million in attorney’s fees.

The Fourth Circuit viewed the evidence differently. Because Wal-Mart did not appeal the district court’s findings with respect to all of the likelihood of confusion factors, the court affirmed the decision with respect to some of the factors. Instead, Wal-Mart appealed the court’s findings on the most important factors: the strength of the plaintiff’s mark (often considered “paramount” by the Fourth Circuit); the similarity of the marks; the defendant’s intent; and the presence or absence of actual confusion.

In reviewing the strength of the mark, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Variety’s BACKYARD marks were “conceptually weak,” but that there was a material dispute as to whether the mark had commercial strength.  The court also concluded that a jury could conclude that the marks were dissimilar in light of the design features and the greater visual emphasis on GRILL. With respect to intent, the court noted that the jury could conclude that Wal-Mart intended to avoid confusion by not pursuing the specific names rejected by the legal department (“Backyard Barbecue” and “Backyard BBQ”) and instead choosing “Backyard Grill.” Finally, the court concluded that the district court improperly rejected Wal-Mart’s survey evidence, noting the district court improperly weighed the evidence at the summary judgment stage. As a result, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment and the monetary awards.

Will Wal-Mart prevail at trial? The Fourth Circuit’s analysis certainly suggests Wal-Mart may have the conceptual weakness of Variety’s BACKYARD marks. It seems like the case is ripe for settlement, but Variety may have an unreasonably high demand, given the district court previously awarded $34 million. Given that us Minneapolitans are going to hit the 70s today (just weeks from a historic April blizzard), I’m comfortable waiting this one out in my own backyard. Let’s just hope we get an answer before the snow returns.